

International Network Generations Roadmap -2021 Edition-

Security and Privacy



An IEEE 5G and Beyond Technology Roadmap futurenetworks.ieee.org/roadmap

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This edition of the INGR is dedicated to the memory of Earl McCune Jr., who left us tragically and too soon on 27 May 2020. Earl was a microwave/RF guru, brilliant technologist, major industry/IEEE contributor, global visionary, keen skeptic, and all around fantastic human being. He was a major contributor to the INGR's early work on energy efficiency, millimeter-wave, and hardware. He worked for a technologically advanced yet more energy efficient world, and the contents of the INGR are a tribute to that vision. Rest in peace, Earl!



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ABSTRACT

The digital transformation brought on by 5G is redefining current models of end-to-end (E2E) connectivity and service reliability to include security-by-design principles necessary to enable 5G to achieve its promise. 5G trustworthiness highlights the importance of embedding security capabilities from the very beginning while the 5G architecture is being defined and standardized. Security requirements need to overlay and permeate through the different layers of 5G systems (physical, network, and application) as well as different parts of an E2E 5G architecture within a risk-management framework that takes into account the evolving security-threats landscape. 5G presents a typical use-case of wireless communication and computer networking convergence, where 5G fundamental building blocks include components such as Software Defined Networks (SDN), Network Functions Virtualization (NFV) and the edge cloud. This convergence extends many of the security challenges and opportunities applicable to SDN/NFV and cloud to 5G networks. Thus, 5G security needs to consider additional security, orchestrator security, cloud security, edge security, etc. At the same time, 5G networks offer security improvement opportunities that should be considered. Here, 5G architectural flexibility, programmability and complexity can be harnessed to improve resilience and reliability.

The working group scope fundamentally addresses the following:

- 5G security considerations need to overlay and permeate through the different layers of the 5G systems (physical, network, and application) as well as different parts of an E2E 5G architecture including a risk management framework that takes into account the evolving security threats landscape.
- 5G exemplifies a use-case of heterogeneous access and computer networking convergence, which extends a unique set of security challenges and opportunities (e.g. related to SDN/NFV and edge cloud, etc.) to 5G networks. Similarly, 5G networks by design offer potential security benefits and opportunities through harnessing the architecture flexibility, programmability and complexity to improve its resilience and reliability.
- The IEEE FNI security WG's roadmap framework follows a taxonomic structure, differentiating the 5G functional pillars and corresponding cybersecurity risks. As part of cross collaboration, the security working group will also look into the security issues associated with other roadmap working groups within the IEEE Future Network Initiative.

Key words:

5G Cybersecurity, security, privacy, data protection, reliability, resilience, mMTC, URLLC, SDN/NFV, cyber risk assessment and management, threat scenarios, cyber attacks, security controls, mitigation, defense.

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